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Abstract
One of theways inwhich the artificial languages ofmathematics are “generous”,
that is, in which they assist the advance of thought, is through their establishment
of advanced operatory structures that permit an even further advance of intuition.
However, this generosity may be delusive, suggest ideas which in the longer
run turn out to be untenable. The paper analyses two cases of “honest
generosity”, namely a “proof” of the sign rule “less times less makes plus” from
the 1340s and a result in partition theory obtained by Euler by means of rash
manipulations of infinite series and products, one perilous case – Cantor’s
introduction of transfinite numbers from 1895 – and (in modern terms) a failed
attempt to extend the semi-group of algebraic powers into a complete group,
also from c. 1340.
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Gewöhnlich glaubt der Mensch, wenn er nur Worte hört
es müsse sich dabei wohl auch was denken lassen
GOETHE, Faust I, 2565–66
He gives the kids free samples
because he knows full well
that today’s young innocent faces
will be tomorrow’s clientele
TOM LEHRER, “The Old Dope Peddler”
Language, operatory thought and intuition
Language is generous: it allows us to communicate and thereby to undertake
tasks we could not even image when left on our non-communicative own. Even
when left on our own, the tool of auto-communication gives us insights wewould
never be able to attain without the support of language. In Piagetian terms,
language is essential for the passage from sensori-motor to operatory cognition;
moreover, the possession of operatory thought at one level allows our intuition
to work at further levels it could never reach when based on sensori-motor
cognition and non-operatory language alone (as the situation was, for all of us,
between roughly two and six years).1
1 For my interpretation of Piaget’s thought (and for the particular emphasis on the notions
of familiarity and concreteness) I refer to [Høyrup 2000a: 235–255].
A short example may serve to familiarize with the essential notions. Time and again,
Piaget refers to this problem:
(1) Edith is fairer than Susan.
(2) Edith is darker than Lily.
Who is darkest?
The problem was one of those which appeared in the IQ-tests designed by Cyril Burt
(tests which the young Piaget re-standardized for a Swizz environment) and one of those
which made Piaget discover that the “errors” of young children were not mere errors
but symptoms of a different way to organize thought. As told by Piaget, the child of ten
will typically argue that both Edith and Susan are fair, while both Edith and Lily are
dark. Edith must thus be in between, Lily must be darkest, and Susan is fairest. For such
complex matters, the thought of the child is still intuitive, and it argues from the way
language distributes objects in categories (“fair”/“dark”). Only at (typically) twelve will
the child be as familiar with the mutual relations between the categories expressed by
language as it is since the age of 2–3 with those between (say) boxes of different size that
can be fitted into each other. Now it may, for example, invert the first statement into
“Susan is darker than Edith” – its thinking has become operatory even for questions
of this kind.
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Language creates a wholly new ontology, consisting of entities that can only
be experienced, togetherwith their properties and the network of relationswithin
which they are spun, through their linguistic realization. Though they receive
part of their emotional loading from non-linguistic sources – in part non-linguistic
symbols, in part directly lived experience – none of those ideals and imagined
communities for which (and in whose name) some of us kill and others die exist
without the mediation of language.
Mathematics, an artificial language par excellence,2 is also generous; directly,
and through its service for sciences concerned with material reality, it has
increased the efficiency of this same killing (and of most of human technological
practice in general) immensely;3 it has done so in particular since the innovations
in symbolism of the Early Modern epoch allowed mathematical thought to
emulate the grammar of natural language freely [Høyrup 2000b].
A different aspect of the efficiency of the mathematical language is that the
familiarity with very abstract objects with which it provides us allows the
intuition of the mathematically trained to go at least one step beyond that which
is safely established and meaningful, and often to do so in a way which is
vindicated by later developments.
Oft-discussed instances of this are the introduction of complex numbers and
the infinitesimal calculus in Leibnizian formulation, the former “guaranteed”
by the applicability of the rules of algebra as known to Cardano (and, in more
mature versions, by later generations), the second by the arithmetic of fractions
and sums. They have the disadvantage as objects for our discussion that the full
development in both cases took centuries, and that pushing-together of this long
development into an instant picture might make us believe that the resulting
Piaget used observations of this kind to distinguish a stage of “concrete operations”
from one of “formal thought”. My own observation of professional mathematicians
(“formal animals” par excellence if such creatures exist) confronted with the Edith-Susan-
Lily problem is that they immediately begin, either to represent the girls by three fingers
or bywriting things down, using a symbolwhich imitates the nestability of boxes (namely
“<”). From the point of view of practical cognitive psychology, “formal thought” is a
philosophical hoax, what is in play is assimilation of new objects – often manipulable
on paper – to the realm of that with which we are so familiar that it has become
“concrete”.
2 At least if we accept the broad delineation of the term given in [Staal 2006: 89–91], as
I shall do here.
3 If anybody should feel that a reference is needed, [Booß-Bavnbek & Høyrup (eds) 2003]
may do.
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sham snapshot really represent exactly that which was vindicated by later
formally based insights. Instead we may look at two real snapshots, one from
the fourteenth and one from the eighteenth century. Afterwards we shall address
two cases of excessive or delusive generosity, illustrating that the quotations from
Goethe and Tom Lehrer apply also to artificial languages.
Honest generosity I: Dardi of Pisa
Our first case is Dardi of Pisa’s proof of the least obvious of the sign rules,
“less times less makes plus”, from his Aliabraa argibra, apparently written in 1344,
and probably borrowing from earlier sources even part of that which we do not
recognize from elsewhere.4
Ora te voio demostrar per numero como men via m˜ fa più a zo che ogni fiada ch’el
te vegniva in costruzion a moltiplicar m˜e via m˜e che tu vezi zertamente ch’el fa più,
com’io te darò l’exenplo manifesto. 8 via 8 fa 64, e questo 8 si è 2 m˜ de 10, e a
moltiplicar lo per l’altro 8, lo qual è ancora 2 m˜ de 10, die similmente far 64. Echo
la prova. Moltiplica 10 via 10, fa 100, e 10 via 2 m˜ fa 20 m˜, e l’altro 10 via 2 m˜ fa
40 m˜, lo qual 40 m˜ traze da 100, e roman 60. Ora manca per conplir la moltiplication
a moltiplicar 2 m˜ via 2 m˜, monta 4 più, lo qual 4 più zonzi sovra 60, monta 64. E
se 2 m˜ via 2 m˜ fosse 4 m˜, questo 4 m˜ se doverave trazer der 60, resterave 56, e così
parerave che 10 m˜ 2 via 10 m˜ 2 fesse 56, la qual cosa non è vera. E così etiandio se
2 m˜ via 2 m˜ fesse niente, la moltiplication de 10 m˜ 2 via 10 m˜ 2 vegnirave a far 60,
la qual cosa è ancora false. Adunqua m˜ via m˜ de necesità vien a far più.
In fairly literal translation but without abbreviations:5
Now I want to demonstrate by number how less times less makes plus, so that every
times you have in a construction to multiply less times less you see with certainty
that it makes plus, of which I shall give you an obvious example. 8 times 8 makes
64, and this 8 is 2 less than 10, and to multiply by the other 8, which is still 2 less
than 10, it should similarly make 64. This is the proof. Multiply 10 by 10, it makes
100, and 10 times 2 less makes 20 less, and the other 10 times 2 less makes 40 less,
which 40 less detract from 100, and there remains 60. Now it is left for the completion
of the multiplication to multiply 2 less times 2 less, it amounts to 4 plus, which 4
plus join above 60, it amounts to 64. And if 2 less times two less had been 4 less,
this 4 less should have been detracted from 60, and 56 would remain, and thus it
would appear that 10 less 2 times 10 less two had been 56, which is not true. And
4 See [Høyrup 2006: 25–31] both for this, for a discussion of the quality of themanuscripts,
and for references to earlier work on Dardi and his treatise. The present quotation is from
the manuscript Vatican, Chigi M.VIII.170, fol. 5v, from c. 1395 (the earliest of the known
manuscripts), with diacritics and punctuation added. The corresponding passage in the
Siena manuscript (c. 1470) is in [Franci 2001: 44].
5 My translation, as everywhere in the following where nothing else is said.
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so also if 2 less times 2 less had been nothing, then the multiplication of 10 less 2
times 10 less 2 would come to be 60, which is still false. Hence less times less by
necessity comes to be plus.
This almost looks like a natural-language discussion, but the passage is followed
by a diagram representing the genuine medium of the argument:
We do not know whether the particular proof is Dardi’s invention,6 but the
diagram for cross-multiplication (used regularly by Dardi) recurs in the
anonymous Trattato dell’alcibra amuchabile [ed. Simi 1994] from c. 1365, a treatise
that does not appear to borrow from Dardi. We may thus legitimately assume
it to represent a shared heritage. A first guess at the sourcemight be theMaghreb
school, where algebraic symbolism of a similar kind had been on its way since
the twelfth century (the symbolic expressions appearing in particular “windows”
and not as part of the running text, exactly like here).7 In the Maghreb writings
we also find formal operations on fractions quite similar to operations turning
up in the Trattato dell’alcibra amuchabile and other fourteenth-century Italianworks
(operations where one or more denominators are polynomials instead of
numbers). However, the Maghreb writers express the multiplication of
polynomials in a different scheme (with both factors on the same line, and the
partial products written below in a way reminding more of the multiplication
of multi-place numbers); although Dardi’s ultimate dependency on Maghreb
sources for the use of symbols is a reasonable assumption, the particular scheme
he uses here appears to have been developed somewhere on the road from the
Maghreb to Pisa.8
6 In any case, Ibn al-Banna¯ had used a somewhat similar argument some decades before
in the Raf al-hija¯b an wuju¯h a ma¯l al-hisa¯b – see [Djebbar 2005: 91].
7 A convenient summary, including important new material, is [Abdeljaouad 2002].
8 Since a somewhat similar diagram appears once in the margin of the Liber mahamaleth
(Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, ms latin 7377A, fol. 109r), an Iberian location is plausible.
It illustrates the sign rules (see also [Sesiano 1988: 96 n. 14]):
From the multiplication of added in added comes nothing but added. From the
multiplication of added in diminished comes nothing but diminished, and from the
multiplication of diminished in added diminished. From the multiplication of
diminished in diminished comes nothing but added.
The diagram is equally abstract, and involves no numbers. No result therefore occurs,
nor the two lines pointing to it; on the other hand, two horizontal lines that do not
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Whether it be his own or a borrowing, Dardi’s argument for the sign rule
was found convincing andwas not forgotten. Luca Pacioli repeats it in the Summa
de arithmetica [1494: 113r], now with the diagram in the margin, and with an
explicit reference to the cross-multiplication; apart from Luca’s verbosity (which
allows us to see that he finds the very concept absurda and an abuse but none
the less necessary – Pacioli, indeed, thinks in terms of negative, not merely
subtractive numbers as does Dardi9), the only innovation is that the alternative
to the alternative is now (–2) (–2) = –2, not (–2) (–2) = 0. We may guess that
the attempt of both authors to cover “all” possibilities and not only the ones that
first had come intuitively to their mind (viz plus and less 4) reflects a wish to
make “real” mathematics (we know nothing about Dardi’s training, but Pacioli
knew his Euclid well, he even published an edition of the Elements). As a matter
of fact, even these attempted exhaustions of all possibilities are based on
intuitions, inspired by things that sometimes happen in the kind of computations
they knew (as revealed by the words in which they express them): either when
a multiplication by something plus nothing is performed, or in a multiplication
by 1.10
Dardi probably did not know, but his argument is almost in the style of
classical analysis: in analysis, we assume that a solution exists and that it behaves
as the objects with which we are already familiar; from this we derive what it
must be. The only shortcoming (the typical shortcoming of intuitive thought)
with respect to this methodological yardstick is that Dardi does not show that
(–2) (–2) has to be +4, instead he shows that +4 fits while alternatives that come
to his mind do not. He does not perform the ensuing synthesis (the step, we may
say, from intuition to critique), which in this casewould indeed imply a complete
correspond to a multiplication (but rather to the m in Dardi’s diagram) have been added:
No comparable diagram is found anywhere in the Liber abbaci – at least not in the
manuscript published in [Boncompagni 1857].
9 This is also visible when he explains that a number of this kind is “less than zero and
in consequence a debt”.
10 The history of the argument does not stop here, Pacioli’s diagram is repeated in the
margin of Feliciano de Latezio’s Libro di arithmetica et geometria speculativa et practicale,
first published in 1526 [Feliciano de Latezio 1563: K3r], now accompanying the example
(14–4) (14–4) and without rejection of alternatives – but still only showing that the sign
rule meno via meno fa più fits, not deriving it as a necessity (cf. imminently).
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justification of the possibility of negative numbers. Only the nineteenth century
provided that proof, but long before that it had been seen that reliance on the
sign rules (and the ensuing operations with negative numbers) never led to
contradictions.11
Honest generosity II: Euler
As a second example of generosity that turned out to be reliable we may
look at two paragraphs from Euler’s Introductio in analysin infinitorum [1748: I,
271–272]:
325. Quod si autem hoc productum
&c.,(1 x) (1 x 2 ) (1 x 3 ) (1 x 4 ) (1 x 5 ) (1 x 6 ),
evolvatur, sequens prodibit series
&c,1 x x 2 2x 3 2x 4 3x 5 4x 6 5x 7 6x 8 8x 9 10x 10
in qua quisque coefficiens indicat, quot variis modis exponens ipsius x per additionem
numerorum inaequalium oriri possit. Sic numerus 9 octo variis modis per additionem
ex numeris inaequalibus formari potest:
9 = 9
9 = 8+1
9 = 7+2
9 = 6+3
9 = 6+2+1
9 = 5+4
9 = 5+3+1
9 = 4+3+2
326. Ut comparationem inter has formas instituamus, sit
P = &c.,(1–x) (1–x 2 ) (1–x 3 ) (1–x 4 ) (1–x 5 ) (1–x 6 )
&
Q = &c.,(1 x) (1 x 2 ) (1 x 3 ) (1 x 4 ) (1 x 5 ) (1 x 6 )
erit
PQ = &c.,(1–x 2 ) (1–x 4 ) (1–x 6 ) (1–x 8 ) (1–x 10 ) (1–x 12 )
qui factores cum omnes in P contineantur, dividatur P per PQ; erit
= &c.,
1
Q
(1–x) (1–x 3 ) (1–x 5 ) (1–x 7 ) (1–x 9 )
ideoque
Q =
1
(1–x) (1–x 3 ) (1–x 5 ) (1–x 7 ) (1–x 9 )etc.
quae fractio si evolvatur, prodibit series, in qua quisque coëfficiens indicabit, quot
variis modis exponens ipsius x per additionem ex numeris imparibus produci possit.
Cum igitur haec expressio aequalis sit illi, quam in §. praecedente contemplati sumus,
11 Strictly speaking, the nineteenth century only proved that integers are just as well-
founded as natural numbers. To my knowledge, the acceptability of the latter still relies
on the experience that paradoxes do not turn up.
- 6 -
sequitur hinc istud theorema:
Quot modis datus numerus per additionem formari potest ex omnibus numeris integris
inter se inaequalibus, totidem modis idem numerus formari poterit per additionem ex numeris
tantum imparibus, sive aequalibus sive inaequalibus.
In translation:
§ 325. If, however,12 one develops the product
(1 x) (1 x 2 ) (1 x 3 ) (1 x 4 ) (1 x 5 ) (1 x 6 )
as a series, then this will be:
,1 x x 2 2x 3 2x 4 3x 5 4x 6 5x 7 6x 8 8x 9 10x 10
and here every coefficient indicates in how many ways the exponent of the
corresponding power of x may arise from addition of unequal integer numbers. Thus
the number 9 can be composed in 8 different ways by addition of unequal numbers,
namely:
9 = 9
9 = 8+1
9 = 7+2
9 = 6+3
9 = 6+2+1
9 = 5+4
9 = 5+3+1
9 = 4+3+2
§ 326. In order to compare now these two forms, let:
P = (1–x) (1–x 2 ) (1–x 3 ) (1–x 4 ) (1–x 5 ) (1–x 6 )
Q = ,(1 x) (1 x 2 ) (1 x 3 ) (1 x 4 ) (1 x 5 ) (1 x 6 )
thus:
PQ = (1–x 2 ) (1–x 4 ) (1–x 6 ) (1–x 8 ) (1–x 10 ) (1–x 12 )
Since all factors of this product are also contained in P, then it follows, if P is divided
by PQ:
= ,
1
Q
(1–x) (1–x 3 ) (1–x 5 ) (1–x 7 ) (1–x 9 )
and hence
Q =
1
(1–x) (1–x 3 ) (1–x 5 ) (1–x 7 ) (1–x 9 )
from which fraction, if it is developed, one gets a series in which every coefficient
indicates in howmay different ways the exponent of the power of x in question may
be produced from addition of odd numbers. As now this expression is the same as
the one which we considered in the preceding paragraph, then this theorem follows:
12 The previous paragraph has developed the unending fraction
1
(1–x) (1–x 2 ) (1–x 3 ) (1–x 4 )
as an infinite series (my formulation), and shown that an coincides1 a1x a2x
2 a
3
x 3
with the number of different ways n can be written as a sum (3 thus as 3, as 2+1, and
as 1+1+1).
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Every number can be composed from odd numbers alone, be they equal, be they unequal,
in exactly as many ways, as it can be formed by addition of all integer but mutually different
numbers.
At first we observe (with some amazement, if we have not studied such matters
before) that Euler’s theorem is correct; secondly, that none of those who would
have loved to know such wonderful properties of numbers in Antiquity or the
Middle Ages (Islamic as well as Latin) had ever noticed them; thirdly, that only
Euler’s highly developed mathematics allowed their derivation – no everyday
intuition in the style of
If I had contracted a debt of 2 florins 2 times less, my total net possession would have been
larger by 4 florins
would ever lead forward. The symbolic language – now far removed from the
inspiration once received from theMaghrebmathematicians – had proven really
generous. As a matter of facts, it gave Euler and his readers much more
astonishing results by quite analogous means, for instance concerning the
connection between the sequence of prime numbers and the ζ-function.13
On the other hand, it is obvious that Euler’s arguments are not rigorous.
Euler does not himself present the intuitive arguments that are needed, in a kind
interpretation he leaves it to the intelligent reader to find them (but see below,
note 14). If the very first step is pinned out, the argument has to run more or
less as follows:
(1) The result of the multiplication must be of the form .∞
i 0
a
i
x i
(2) The power x0 results only if the term 1 is chosen in all factors, whence
a0 = 1.
(3) The power x1 results only if x is chosen from the first factor, and 1 from
all the others, whence a1 = 1.
(4) The power x2 results only if x2 is chosen from the second factor, and 1
13 ζ(s) = = [Euler 1748: I, 225f]. The trick is simple: Each fraction∞
n 1
1
n s
1
m prime
(1– 1
m s
)
is developed as a power series . Multiplying these series
1
1– 1
m s
1
1
m s
(
1
m s
)2 (
1
m s
)3 ...
together, keeping only those partial products where the number of factors different from
1 is finite, and using that each number can be expressed in a unique way as a product
of powers of primes, we get the result. Provided, evidently, that the operations are
meaningful, which on its part is not immediately evident.
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from all the others, whence a2 = 1.
(5) The power x3 results either if x is chosen from the first and x2 from the
second factor, and 1 from all the others, or if x3 is chosen from the third
factor, and 1 from all the others; hence a3 = 2.
.
.
.
(n) Similarly, the power xn results if we take the xi-term from such terms
that = n and 1 from all the other factors, that is, in as many waysi
as n can be written as a sum where all i are different.i
A very nice piece of analysis, also in the classical sense: we assume that the
result of the infinite product exists, and that it can be found as a sum of partial
products just in the way we are accustomed to – and that the infinity of the
number of partial products where the sum of exponents is infinite is overruled
by the infinitely small value which these terms have if only x is small. Finally,
it is needed that two infinite power series can only be identical if all coefficients
are pairwise identical – just as is the case for finite series, that is, for
polynomials.14
The operations needed for showing the theorem about the partitions as well
as the one about primes and ζ-function turned out to be justifiable in the
nineteenth century; but in 1748 it asked for Euler’s fine intuition not to end up
in absurdities (and as we see in note 14, even Euler’s intuition was not always
sufficient).
Perilous generosity, or, set theory saved in extremis from addiction
Absurdities did result (together with wonderful results) from another
intercourse with the infinite. Apparently, Georg Cantor’s “Beiträge zur
Begründung der transfinitenMengenlehre” [1895]moves onwell-trodden paths.
A “set” is explained (p. 481) to be any collection of well-determined, distinct
14 But woe, at an earlier point [Euler 1748: I, 222] a similar operation is performed on the
product = (1+2)(1+3)(1+5)(1+7)(1+11)(1+13)... . Even here, all partial
m prime
(1 m)
products which contain more than a finite number of factors different from 1 (and which
are thus infinitely great!) are disregarded, and the product is “shown” to equal the sum
1+2+3+5+6+7+10+11+13+14+15+17+... of all natural numbers that are not divisible by
the square of a prime number. In this case it is difficult to see what meaning to attribute
to the result – which is hence beyond the categories of true and false. Only set theory
allows an interpretation – viz ℵ = ℵ0!
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objects, and its “potency” (“Mächtigkeit”) or “cardinal number” results when
our active intellect removes the particular characteristics and the order of the
elements by an act of abstraction; the cardinal number is thus (p. 482) a set
consisting of mere units deprived of all characteristics (except that of being
distinct). All of this sounds perfectly Aristotelian, and should lead to no more
problems than ancient Greek arithmetic.
Evidently Cantor knew the techniques by which his nineteenth-century
predecessors had derived the integers, the rational numbers and the real numbers
from the natural numbers, that is, essentially from the Greek Anzahlen, and his
arguments surrounding these are perfectly sound, in the sense that even shortcuts
of the type “it is easily seen that” can be filled out by anybody possessing
familiarity with these techniques; if intuition plays a role, then it is an intuition
that can easily be made operational. Cantor is also quite aware that care has to
be taken; he points out (p. 501) that a vicious circle in Veronese’s definition of
“equality” of transfinite numbers leads the latter to invent objects which “have
no existence, if not that on the paper”.
None the less, this first version of Cantor’s theory of sets did not avoid the
trouble of vicious circles, not apparent in the definitions but arising as
unsuspected consequences. What happened?
Firstly, Cantor leaves behind the familiar ground of ancient arithmetic when
he allows the objects which make up a set to be objects “for our perception or
our thought”. This seems to be an innocuous generalization of the monads
making up an ancient Greek αριθµος (or no generalization at all, since no Greek
philosopher seems ever to have excluded the counting of mental objects
explicitly). As Cantor’s reader finds out soon, however, even sets and transfinite
cardinal numbers are meant to be objects that can be elements in sets; in
consequence, Cantor is able to find the actual infinite, emphatically rejected by
Aristotle. The reader also finds it to be supposed always possible (p. 493), if
elements t1, t2, ..., tn–1 have been taken from a transfinite set T, “to take out yet
another element tn” – in complete agreement with our experience with natural
numbers (where a rule for doing so is easily invented, for instance to take tn =
t1+t2+...+tn–1+1). In both cases, intuition based on previous experience turned out
to be problematic. As only too well known, sets of sets lead to paradoxes; Russell
andWhitehead’s theory of types tried to avoid them by prohibiting the collection
of objects of different “type” into the same set, but if this is taken into account
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several of Cantor’s proofs have to be reshaped with great care.15 The possibility
“to take out yet another element tn” without any need for specifying a rule for
choosing it also turned out at Zermelo’s closer investigation to be a postulate,
the “axiom of choice”, and no matter of course.
Delusive generosity, or, the failed extension of a semi-group
Though that was not his aim, Dardi’s proof of the sign rule can be seen from
a later point of view to allow the extension of the natural numbers organized
with addition and multiplication into the ring of (similarly organized) integers.
In this case, the generosity of his language gave him even more than he asked
for (and Pacioli as much as he asked for since it was “necessary” albeit “absurd”).
Almost contemporary with Dardi is an attempt to extend the semi-group
of non-negative algebraic powers (organized with multiplication) into a group.
In the Vatican manuscript Vat. Lat. 10488 we find the following:16
fol. 29v
Algebra
Queste sono alchune ragioni assemprate
di 1 libro fato per mano di Giovanni di
Davizo de l’Abacho da Firenza schrito su
quelo ad 15 setembre ani 1339, è questo
1424.
fol. 29v
Algebra
These are some computations collected
from a book made by the hand of
Giovanni di Davizzo dell’Abacho from
Florence written the 15th of September
1339, this is 1424.
Sapi che moltiplicare numero per chubo
fa chubo
e numero per per zenso fa zenso
e numero per chosa fa chosa.
Know that to multiply number by cube
makes a cube
and number by censo makes censo
and number by thing makes thing
E più via più fa più
e meno via meno fa più
e più via meno fa meno
And plus times plus makes plus
and less times less makes plus
and plus times less makes less
15 Aristotle’s barring of a broad category of sophisms through the introduction of
ontologically based syllogistic logic comes to mind as a parallel. It achieved its purpose,
or largely so; but in consequence most of Euclid’s demonstrations are not based on
“logic” – see, e.g., [Harari 2003].
16 The non-mathematical abbreviations are resolved (but not , here rendered , standing
for radice), and diacritics as well as punctuation are added. I use the most recent of the
two discordant foliations. Words inserted above the line are marked ^ ^, deletions with
a stroke, forgotten words and passages are in 〈 〉.
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e meno via più fa meno. and less times plus makes less.
E sapi che una chose via una chosa fa 1
zenso
e zenso via zenso fa zenso di zenso
e cosa via zenso fa chubo
e chubo via chubo fa chubo di chubo
e zenso via chubo fa zenso di chubo.
And know that a thing times a thing
makes a censo
and censo times censo makes censo of
censo
and thing times censo makes cube
and cube times cube makes cube of cube
and censo times cube makes censo of
cube.
E sapi partire numero per chosa viene
numero
e partire numero per zenso viene
e partire chosa per zenso viene numero
e partire numero per chubo viene
chubica
e partire chosa per chubo viene
e partire zenso per chubo viene numero
e partire numero per zenso di zenso viene
di
e partire chosa per zenso di zenso viene
chubica
e partire zenso per zenso di zenso viene
e partire chubo per zenso di zenso viene
numero
And know that dividing number by thing
gives number
and dividing number by censo gives root
and dividing thing by censo gives number
and dividing number by cube gives cube
root
and dividing thing by cube gives root
and dividing censo by cube gives number
and dividing number by censo of censo
gives root of root
and dividing thing by censo of censo
gives cube root
and dividing censo by censo of censo
gives root
and dividing cube by censo of censo gives
number
fol. 30r
e partire numero per chubo di chubo
viene chubicha di chubica
e partire chosa per chubo di chubo viene
di chubica
e partire zenso per chubo di chubo viene
di
e partire chubo per chubo di chubo viene
chubicha
e partire zenso di zenso per chubo di
chubo viene
e partire zenso di chubo per chubo viene
numero———— zenso*
e partire numero per zenso di zenso di
zenso di zenso viene di di di
fol. 30r
and dividing number by cube of cube
gives cube root of cube root
and dividing thing by cube of cube gives
root of cube root
and dividing censo by cube of cube gives
root of root
and dividing cube by cube of cube gives
cube root
and dividing censo of censo by cube of
cube gives root
and dividing censo of cube by cube gives
number———— censo*
and dividing number by censo of censo
of censo of censo gives root of root of
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e partire numero per chubo di chubo di
chubo di chubo viene chubicha di
chubicha di chubicha di
chubicha.
root of root
and dividing number by cube of cube of
cube of cube gives cube root of cube
root of cube root of cube root.
Se voi moltiplichare per , moltiplicha
di 9 via di 9, dì 9 via 9 fa 81, e
farà di 81, et e fata.
Dividere di 40 per di 8, parti 40 per
8, viene 5, e di 5 sia.
Parti di 25 per di 9, parti 25 per 9,
viene di 2 e 7/9, fata.
Se voi moltiplichare 7 via—— ^meno^ di 6
per se, fa 7 via 7, fa 49, giungi 6 chon
〈49, fa〉 55, e 7 via 6 fa 42, poi
moltiplicha 7 via 42, fa 294, e
moltiplicha poi 4 via 294, fa 1176,
dicho che 55 meno di 1176 farà
moltiplichato 7 meno di 6 fata—— per
se, fata.
If you want to multiply root by root,
multiply root of 9 times root of 9, say,
9 times 9 makes 81, and it will make
the root of 81, and it is done.
To divide root of 40 by root of 8, divide
40 by 8, it gives 5, and root of 5 let it
be.
To divide root of 25 by root of 9, divide
25 by 9, it gives root of 27/9, done.
If you want to multiply 7 less root of 6 by
itself, do 7 times 7, it makes 49, join
6 with 〈49, it makes〉 55, and 7 times
6 makes 42, then multiply 7 times 42,
it makes 294, and multiply then 4
times 294, it makes 1176, I say that 55
less root of 1176 will it make when 7
less root of 6 is multiplied by itself,
done.
fol. 30v
Se voi trarre di 8 per [sic] di 18 fa 8
via 18, fa 144, sua è 12, e di, 12 e 12
fa 24, e dì, 8 e 18 fa 26, trai 24 di 26,
resta——— e di 2 rimarà, fata.
Se voi giungere di 8 chon di 18, fa 8
via 18, fa 144, sua è 12, e dì, 12 e 12
fa 24, e dì, 8 e 18 fa 26, e giungni 24
e 26, fa 50, e di 50 sarà il numero.
Se voi moltiplichare 5 e di 4 via 5 meno
di 4, fa chosì e dì, 5 via 5 fa 25, e
dì, 5 via di 4, fa chosì, recha 5 a ,
fa 25, e fa di 25 via di 4, fa di
100, e fa 5 via meno di 4, fa meno
di 100, resta pure 25, ora tra 4 di
25, resta 21, e 21 fano.
fol. 30v
If you want to detract root of 8 from root
of 18, do 8 times 18, it makes 144, its
root is 12, and say, 8 and 18 makes
26, detract 24 from 26, and root of 2
will remain, done.
It you want to join root of 8 with root of
18, do 8 times 18, it makes 144, its
root is 12, and say, 12 and 12 makes
24, and say, 8 and 18 makes 26, and
join 24 and 26, it makes 50, and root
of 50 will the number be.
If you want to multiply 5 and root of 4
times 5 less root of 4, do thus and
say, 5 times 5 makes 25, and say, 5
times root of 4, do thus, bring 5 to
root, it makes 25, and do root of 25
times root of 4, it makes root of 100,
and make 5 times less root of 4, it
- 13 -
Se voi moltiplichare 7 e di 9 via 7 e
di 9, fa 7 via 7, fa 49, poni quel 9, ài
58, e 9 via 49 fa 441, moltiplicha per
4, fa 1764, ài che farà 58 e di 1764
che è 42, fata.
Se voi partire 35 per di 4 e per di 9
fa chosì, da 4 a 9 si à 5, moltiplicha
5 via 5 fa 25, e dì, rechare 35 a fa
1225, ora dì, 4 via 1225 fa 4900, parti
per 25, viene 196, e fa 9 via 1225, fa
11025, parti in 25, viene 441. Abiamo
che partire 35 per di 4 e per di 9
viene di 441 meno di 196, et è
fata.
makes less root of 100, 25 still
remains, now detract 4 from 25, 21
remains, and 21 they make.
If you want to multiply 7 and root of 9
times 7 and root of 9, do 7 times 7, it
makes 49, put (above) this 9, you
have 58, and 9 times 49 makes 441,
multiply by 4, it makes 1764, you
have that it will make 58 and root of
1764, which is 42, done.
If you want to divide 35 by root of 4 and
by root of 9, do thus, from 4 to 9
there is 5, multiply 5 times 5, it makes
25, and say, bring 35 to root, it makes
1225, now say, 4 times 1225 makes
4900, divide by 25, it makes 196, and
do 9 times 1225, it makes 11025,
divide by 25, it gives 441. We have
that dividing 35 by root of 4 and by
root of 9 gives root of 441 less root of
196, and it is done.
* Correction apparently made in the same hand. Presumably Giovanni di Davizzo’s original text
was (or was intended to be):
e partire zenso di chubo per chubo di chubo viene numero.
Somewhere in the process, this had become
e partire zenso di chubo per chubo viene numero.
Noticing the error, somebody – presumably the writer of the manuscript – discovered that this
was wrong, and stated the correct result.
This is followed by 19 rules for solving reduced equations of the first, second,
third and fourth degree.
The extract starts, in modern terms, by presenting through examples17 the
semi-group of positive powers of the unknown, designated a thing/cosa (which
we may represent by t). Its square is a censo – which we (taking advantage of
the arithmetization of powers introduced by Chuquet and Bombelli) are able
to designate by t2, whereas t3 is a cube. The designations for the higher powers
are composedmultiplicatively, without nesting (even though nesting is suggested
17 Not very orderly, as we observe; and in the middle of the presentation we find the sign
rules.
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by the use of the genitive18). The censo of censo is thus t2 t2 = t4, the cube of cube
is t3 t3 = t6, the censo of cube is t2 t3, etc.
Once we know that, all products tm tn are seen to be expressed correctly,
and so is the only division tm÷tn where m>n≥0 (censo of cube by cube). The semi-
group of non-negative powers is thus treated coherently. In contrast, divisions
tm÷tn where m<n look strange. However, they are quite systematic. If we forget
about the meaning of the words “root” and “cube root” and take to be the
inverse of a censo (i.e., to be t–2), cubica to be that of a cube (i.e., to be t–3) and
their composition to be multiplicative, everything turns out to be meaningful,
except in cases where n = m+1 and where the outcome of the division is thus
t–1. Here, Giovanni and his copyist assert that the result is number, that is, of
power t0. Apparently, a hunch of arithmetization interferes, in the sense that
is associated with the number 2, and conceptualized as a “second root”, and
cubica with “third root”. “First root”, not known as a standard operation, is
then identified with the number.
Giovanni thus has not thought through the matter; since every abbacus
master knew, then even he must have been aware that if a÷b = c, then c b = a,
and therefore, if “dividing number by thing gives number”, then “number by
thing” makes number, not thing as he has stated earlier. Moreover, he can be
assumed to have knownwell what root reallymeans, since the subsequent section
of the arithmetic of roots is fully correct and makes use in several places of the
rule √n √n = n. He can never have used his daring extension of the semi-group
for any practical purpose, since then its inherent contradictions would have
exploded it. In the most literal (but also in the Piagetian) sense, it stays at the
intuitive level, and never reaches that of operatory thought.19
This holds not only for Giovanni. As we see, his text was copied in 1424 by
18 Evidently, Giovanni’s Italian terminology follows traditions shaped in other languages
and grammatical structures. Both Diophantos and the Arabic traditions (for whose
probably connection in the designation of higher powers I shall not argue in this place)
also use multiplication, not nesting; actually, this choice facilitates the production of names
for all powers – when nesting without arithmetization took over (for instance in Pacioli’s
Summa), t5, t7, t11 etc. asked for the introduction of independent names (primo relato, secondo
relato, etc.).
19 Tools to go beyond this level were at hand and used by other abbacus writers. In the
algebra section of an anonymous Tractato sopra l’arte della arismetricha volgaramente chiamata
abacho [ed. Franci & Pancanti 1988: 3–6] from c. 1390–1400, the rules for multiplying the
positive powers (and for multiplying one of these by the square root of a number) are
illustrated perfectly by numerical examples; if Giovanni had tried this, his construction
would have collapsed immediately.
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somebody who understood it well enough to repair correctly (though hardly
as intended by Giovanni) an error that had crept in during copying. Moreover,
in Piero della Francesca’s Trattato d’abaco (earlier than c. 1480) [ed. Arrighi 1970:
84f, emphasis added] we find the following:
Sappi che cosa via cosa fa censo, et cosa via censo fa cubo, et censo via censo fa censo
di censo, et cosa via cubo fa censo di censo, et cubo via cubo fa cubo di censo [sic],
et censo via cubo fa censo di cubo.
Sappi che a partire numero per cosa ne vene numero, et partire cosa per censo
ne vene numero, e partire numero per censo ne ve’ radici, et partire censo per cubo
ne vene numero, et partire numero per censo di censo ne vene radici de radici, et
partire cosa per censo di censo ne vene radici cuba, et partire censo per censo di censo
ne vene radici, et partire cubo per censo di censo ne vene numero, e partire numero
per cubo di cubo ne vene radici cubicha 〈di radice cubica〉, e partire cosa per cubo
di cubo ne vene radici 〈di radice〉 cubica, et partire censo per cubo di cubo ne vene
radici de radici, et a partire chubo per cubo di cubo ne vene radici cubica, et partire
censo di censo per cubo di cubo ne vene radici, et partire censo de cubo per cubo di chubo
ne v[e]ne numero, et a partire numero per cubo ven radici cuba, e a partire cosa per
cubo ven radici, et partire numero per censo di censo di censo ven radici de radici
de radici, et partire numero per cubo de cubo di cubo ven radici cuba de radici cuba
de radici cuba.
As we see, the rules are almost exactly as those in the quotation from Giovanni
di Davizzo (confirming, by the way, the hypothesis of note (*)). This leaves little
doubt that Giovanni di Davizzo is Piero’s ultimate source.20 But as we also see,
the order of the rules is not the same. Either Piero himself or, rather, some
intermediary21 must thus have understood the project well enough to tinker
with it, though not well enough to see that it was a nonsensical blind alley. One
strand of abbacus mathematics thus walked up and down this alley for more
than a century without discovering that it led nowhere.22 Piero, claiming to
20 Other early Italian algebra writings speak against the possibility that Giovanni himself
has copied the passage wholesale from a predecessor although they do not exclude it.
What can apparently be excluded is a borrowing from Arabic algebra – at least since al-
Karajı¯, the inverses of algebraic powers had been dealt with coherently.
21 Indeed, the passage in question is found almost verbatim in Giovanni Guiducci’s Libro
d’arismetricha from c. 1465 – see [Giusti 1993: 205].
22 It was during the same century that erroneous solutions to non-reducible higher-degree
equations were repeated uncritically by a large number of algebra authors, including Piero.
Luca Pacioli, probably less gifted as a geometer than Piero but obviously a keener explorer
of the algebra writings he made use of, discovered the error, just as he avoided Giovanni
di Davizzo’s paradoxes. Others too, like the anonymous author referred to in note 19,
kept clear of the fallacies.
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write a treatise about “certain abbacus things that are necessary for merchants”
[ed. Arrighi 1970: 39], could do so because neither he nor any merchant had the
least operatory need for it.
Final meditations
What do these examples teach us? First of all, that the artificial languages
of mathematics confirm another maxim pronounced by Goethe’s Mephisto
(concerning theology, also presented by him as a kind of artificial language)
(Faust, I, 1995-99):
[...] wo Begriffe fehlen,
Da stellt ein Wort zur rechten Zeit sich ein.
Mit Worten läßt sich trefflich streiten,
Mit Worten ein System bereiten,
An Worte läßt sich trefflich glauben,
[...]23
that is, they allow us to go beyond that which we grasp in fully operatory
concepts (Begriffe) and project our thought into the unknown. This is not all there
is to their generosity, but it may be their most creative as well as their most
treacherous aspect. In cases where no real jump is made because no operations
are implied that are not already tested (as in the case of Dardi’s proof), no danger
is involved. When the jump is really one, only a process of making operational
the suggested concepts, of trying them out in (theoretical) practice (thus doing
with the artificial “vocabulary” and its grammar what we all did with those of
basic natural language between the ages of five and ten years) can distinguish
such entities which “exist only on paper” from such as are or can be made
None the less, the mistaken extension of the semi-group survived Pacioli’s Summa.
Giovanni’s first 15 rules are still found, in exactly the same order, in Bento Fernandes’
Tratado da arte de arismetica from 1555; some of the wrong rules for solving higher-degree
equations are also repeated by Fernandes. For both, see Silva 2006: 14, 30–33].
23 For just where fails the comprehension,
A word steps promptly in as deputy.
With words ’tis excellent disputing;
Systems to words ’tis easy suiting;
On words ’tis excellent believing;
[...].
(trans. Bayard Taylor, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14591/14591-h/14591-h.htm#III).
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coherently meaningful;24 where no such “active mathematician’s practice” takes
place, inventions like that of Giovanni di Davizzo (or that of Euler referred to
in note 14) may survive indefinitely long, guaranteed as they seem to be by their
expressibility in the venerated language ofmathematics.Mephistowas certainly
right that the same may happen in theology – not to speak of philosophy, yet
another venerated artificial language (or cluster of languages) which has served
to legitimate much addictive nonsense; but these are different topics.
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